中国安全科学学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (11): 1-8.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.11.2317

• 安全科学理论与安全系统科学 •    下一篇

铁路时间同步网挑战应答身份认证安全性分析

兰丽(), 王潇霖   

  1. 兰州交通大学 电子与信息工程学院,甘肃 兰州 730070
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-10 修回日期:2022-09-13 出版日期:2022-11-28 发布日期:2023-05-28
  • 作者简介:

    兰丽 (1978—),女,宁夏平罗人,博士,副教授,主要从事铁路信息安全、交通信息工程及控制等方面的研究。E-mail:

  • 基金资助:
    甘肃省自然科学基金资助(20JR10RA218)

Safety analysis of challenge response authentication in railway time synchronization network

LAN Li(), WANG Xiaolin   

  1. School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou Gansu 730070,China
  • Received:2022-05-10 Revised:2022-09-13 Online:2022-11-28 Published:2023-05-28

摘要:

为保障铁路系统可靠稳定运行,提高铁路时间同步网安全防护能力,利用着色Petri网(CPN)分析铁路时间同步网身份认证的安全性。首先,基于Autokey模型的时间同步协议认证过程,建立基于公共参数的挑战应答身份认证过程的CPN模型,同时,利用该模型分析基于公共参数的挑战应答运行机制可能存在的漏洞。然后,建立中间人攻击下的挑战应答过程的CPN模型,并利用逆向状态分析法建立模型的状态方程,分析身份认证协议不安全状态的可达性。最后,利用CPN Tools软件仿真验证安全性分析结果。结果表明:CPN模型分析出铁路时间同步网挑战应答身份认证的过程存在安全漏洞,客户端对挑战应答报文源信息验证的缺乏,会导致中间人伪造的挑战应答报文可以通过客户端身份认证,实现操纵时间节点的目的。通过该模型演绎中间人的攻击序列,可为铁路时间同步网在制定安全防护策略时提供重要参考。

关键词: 铁路时间同步网, 挑战应答, 身份认证, 安全性分析, 着色Petri网(CPN), 中间人攻击

Abstract:

In order to ensure the reliable and stable operation of the railway system and improve the safety protection capability of the railway time synchronization network, CPN was used to analyze the safety of the identity authentication of the railway time synchronization network. Firstly, based on the Autokey model of the time synchronization protocol authentication process, the CPN model of the challenge-response identity authentication process based on public parameters was established. At the same time, this model was used to analyze the possible vulnerabilities of the challenge-response mechanism based on common parameters. Secondly, a CPN model of the challenge-response process under the man-in-middle attack was established. The state equation of the model was established by using the reverse state analysis method to analyze the reachability of the insecure state of the identity authentication protocol. Finally, the safety analysis results were simulated and verified by CPN Tools. The results show that the CPN model analyzes that there are safety vulnerabilities in the process of challenge-response authentication in the railway time synchronization network, and the client lacks the verification of the source information of the challenge-response packet. As a result, the forged challenge-response packet can be authenticated by the client to achieve the purpose of manipulating the time node. The model deduces the man-in-middle attack sequence, which provides an important reference for the safety protection strategy of the railway time synchronization network.

Key words: railway time synchronization network, challenge-response, identity authentication, safety analysis, colored Petri nets(CPN), man-in-middle attack