Abstract:

Emergency medical material reserve of a certain scale is established for the realization of the armys rapid response service guarantee capability. In order to study the moral risk caused by the asymmetry of information on the effort level between the army and the storage enterprises in the process of emergency medical material production capacity reserve, the military representative's mid-term supervision system was introduced into the design of the reserve incentive mechanism in combination with the characteristics of the army, and a two-stage incentive model was constructed to analyze the influence of the enterprise's effort level and the mid-term supervision of the military representative on the incentive effect, and to make a comparison with the situation of no mid-term supervision. The results show that the military medium-term supervision system has a significant incentive effect on the storage enterprises, can effectively inhibit the lazy behavior of the enterprises and enhance the effectiveness of emergency material protection, thus providing decision support for the formulation of incentive policies for the army production capacity reserve under the condition of asymmetric information.

Key words: emergency medical supplies, production capacity reserves, reserves incentive, military medium-term supervision, principal-agent theory