考虑维护水平的城镇防汛物资政企联合储备决策

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.04.0256

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (4): 202-209.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.04.0256

考虑维护水平的城镇防汛物资政企联合储备决策

王喆¹^,²(), 丛子皓¹^,², 梁梦宇¹^,², 刘丹¹^,², 马勇³, 夏小棠⁴^,^**()

¹ 武汉理工大学安全科学与应急管理学院,湖北武汉 430070
² 武汉理工大学中国应急管理研究中心,湖北武汉 430070
³ 武汉理工大学航运学院,湖北武汉 430063
⁴ 武汉科技大学城市建设学院, 湖北武汉 430065

收稿日期:2022-11-12 修回日期:2023-02-08 出版日期:2023-04-28
通讯作者:
^** 夏小棠(1984—),女,湖北武汉人,博士,副教授,硕士生导师,主要从事城市规划与设计、智能城市建设等方面的研究。E-mail:xiaxiaotang@wust.edu.cn。
作者简介:
王喆 (1980—),男,湖北武汉人,工学博士,副教授,博士生导师,主要从事应急决策、博弈论、应急物流等方面的研究。E-mail:philo_wang@163.com。
刘丹副教授
马勇教授
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助(71501151); 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助(20YJC630154); 湖北省自然科学基金资助(2020CFA055); 湖北省自然科学基金资助(2016CFB467)

Government-enterprise joint reserve decision for urban flood control materials considering level of maintenance

WANG Zhe¹^,²(), CONG Zihao¹^,², LIANG Mengyu¹^,², LIU Dan¹^,², MA Yong³, XIA Xiaotang⁴^,^**()

¹ School of Safety Science and Emergency Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430070, China
² China Research Center for Emergency Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430070, China
³ School of Navigation, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430063, China
⁴ School of Urban Construction, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430065, China

Received:2022-11-12 Revised:2023-02-08 Published:2023-04-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为科学制定城镇防汛物资代储方案,针对城镇洪涝灾害呈周期性随机发生的特点,通过构建微分博弈模型,研究政府与企业联合储备和持续维护的过程来保障应急处置需求,进而构建政府单一储备决策、政企联合储备决策和Stackelberg决策下的政企维护水平模型,分析维护水平对物资损耗程度和系统利润的影响,并利用Mathematic软件,以2016年武汉城市内涝为背景进行仿真分析。结果表明:考虑政企维护水平可以有效减少物资损耗,政企联合储备决策优于Stackelberg决策和政府单一储备决策,在政企联合储备决策下政企双方维护水平、物资存量及系统的总利润可实现帕累托最优。

关键词: 维护水平, 城镇防汛物资, 政企联合储备决策, 微分博弈, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

In order to scientifically develop the agent storage plan of urban flood control materials, in view of the periodic random occurrence of urban flood disasters, a differential game model was constructed to study the process of government and enterprise joint reserve and continuous maintenance to guarantee the demand for emergency response. Furthermore, the government-enterprise maintenance level models under the single reserve decision of the government, the joint reserve decision of government-enterprises and the Stackelberg decision were established, and the influence of maintenance level on material loss degree and system profit was analyzed. Moreover, Taking Wuhan urban waterlogging 2016 as the background, the simulation analysis was carried out by using Mathematic software. The results show that considering the maintenance level of government and enterprises can effectively reduce the material loss, and the government-enterprise joint reserve decision is better than the Stackelberg decision and the government single reserve decision. Under the government-enterprise joint reserve model, the maintenance level, material stock and total profit of the system can be Pareto optimal.

Key words: urban flood control material, government-enterprise joint reserve decision-making, differential game, Stackelberg game, maintenance level

王喆, 丛子皓, 梁梦宇, 刘丹, 马勇, 夏小棠. 考虑维护水平的城镇防汛物资政企联合储备决策[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(4): 202-209.

WANG Zhe, CONG Zihao, LIANG Mengyu, LIU Dan, MA Yong, XIA Xiaotang. Government-enterprise joint reserve decision for urban flood control materials considering level of maintenance[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2023, 33(4): 202-209.

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影响因素	政府单一储备决策	政企联合储备决策	Stackelberg 决策
更新维护水平	0.37	0.528	0.425
监督维护水平	0	0.70	0.26
物资存量	0. 176	0.51	0.485
成本分担	—	—	0.87
企业利润	6.51	—	19.21
政府成本	86.94	—	41.90
系统总利润	-80.43	-8.64	-22.69

考虑维护水平的城镇防汛物资政企联合储备决策

Government-enterprise joint reserve decision for urban flood control materials considering level of maintenance

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