动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为演化分析

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.01.007

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 51-57.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.01.007

• 安全社会科学与安全管理 • 上一篇下一篇

动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为演化分析

陈述¹(), 任亚萍¹, 席炎²^,^**(), 向蕾¹, 崔洁¹

¹三峡大学水利与环境学院,湖北宜昌 443002
²中南建筑设计院股份有限公司,湖北武汉 430070

收稿日期:2021-10-17 修回日期:2021-12-15 出版日期:2022-01-28 发布日期:2022-07-28
通讯作者: 席炎
作者简介:
陈述(1986—),男,湖北英山人,博士,副教授,主要从事安全管理方面的研究。E-mail: chenshu@ctgu.edu.cn。
陈述副教授
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助(52079073)

Evolutionary analysis on work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism

CHEN Shu¹(), REN Yaping¹, XI Yan²^,^**(), XIANG Lei¹, CUI Jie¹

¹College of Hydraulic & Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University, Yichang Hubei 443002, China
²Central South Architectural Design Institute Co., Ltd., Wuhan Hubei 430070, China

Received:2021-10-17 Revised:2021-12-15 Online:2022-01-28 Published:2022-07-28
Contact: XI Yan

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为揭示动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为规律,以企业成本和收益为基础,通过区域内所有企业的博弈,运用演化博弈理论研究不同策略下企业对安全生产投入达标行为演化趋势。研究结果表明:当政府监管能力有约束时,无论企业是否明确预设控制目标,均可能出现投机心理,而政府加大惩罚力度可有效改善整体安全生产水平;同时,企业明确控制目标时,通过调控控制目标可有效改善群体的行为;政府不仅要加强向社会公布安全生产信息,还应合理确定预设目标、惩罚力度,积极引导区域产生良好初始状态,这样可推动群体向较好方向发展。

关键词: 动态惩罚机制, 安全生产行为, 演化分析, 规制策略, 预设目标

Abstract:

In order to explore laws of work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism, with costs and benefits as bases, evolution trend of enterprises' investment in safety production under different strategies was studied by using evolutionary game theory among firms in the region. The results show that when government's supervision ability is obviously restricted, a company is likely to be speculative no matter whether it is clear about safety production control target, but the government can effectively improve overall safety production level by strengthening penalties. At the same time, when firms have a clear control goal, behavior of all companies can be effectively improved by adjusting the goal reasonably. Moreover, it is found that government should not only enhance information exposure of safety production to social firms, but also reasonably determine preset goals, and punishment level, as well as actively guide the region to nurture a good initial state, so as to promote development of company groups in a good direction.

Key words: dynamic punishment mechanism, work safety behavior, evolutionary analysis, regulatory strategies, preset goal

陈述, 任亚萍, 席炎, 向蕾, 崔洁. 动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为演化分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(1): 51-57.

CHEN Shu, REN Yaping, XI Yan, XIANG Lei, CUI Jie. Evolutionary analysis on work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2022, 32(1): 51-57.

图/表 4

表1

目标明确型平衡点的稳定性

平衡点	稳定性判别式	稳定性存在条件
		$b < a$			$a < b < β a$		$β a < b$
		$0 ≤ O ≤ b / β a$	$b / β a < O < b / a$	$b / a ≤ O ≤ 1$	$0 ≤ O ≤ b / β a$	$b / β a < O ≤ 1$	$β a < b$
$x = 0$	$g' (0) = - b < 0$	稳定点	稳定点	稳定点	稳定点	稳定点	稳定点
$x = b / β a$	$g' (b / β a) = b (β a - b) / β a > 0$	不存在	非稳定点	非稳定点	不存在	非稳定点	不存在
$x = O$	$g 1 (O) · g 2 (O) = [O (1 - O)] 2 (O β a - b) (O a - b)$	不存在	稳定点	不存在	不存在	稳定点	不存在
$x = b / a$	$g' (b / a) = b (a - b) / a > 0$	非稳定点	非稳定点	不存在	不存在	不存在	不存在
$x = 1$	$g' (1) = b - a$	稳定点	稳定点	稳定点	非稳定点	非稳定点	非稳定点

表1

图1

表2

目标模糊型平衡点的稳定性

平衡点	稳定性判别式	稳定性存在条件
		$b > a$		$b < a$
		$β > 2 (b + b (b - a)) / a$	$β ≤ 2 (b + b (b - a)) / a$	$b < a$
$x = 0$	$G' (0) < 0$	稳定点	稳定点	稳定点
$x 1 = β a - Δ / [2 a (β - 1)]$	$G' (x 1) > 0$	非稳定点	不存在	非稳定点
$x 2 = β a + Δ / [2 a (β - 1)]$	$G' (x 2) < 0$	稳定点	不存在	不存在
$x 3 = β / 2 (β - 1)$	$G' (x 3) = 0$	不存在	非稳定点	不存在
$x = 1$	$G' (1) = b - a$	非稳定点	非稳定点	稳定点

表2

图2

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动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为演化分析

Evolutionary analysis on work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism

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