Abstract:

In order to effectively address the escalating challenges of natural disasters and enhance the efficiency of the enterprise-led emergency supply reserve system, an economic information disclosure mechanism was proposed to boost enterprise participation. Firstly, an enterprise-led emergency supply reserve model was constructed based on an option contract to clarify the intrinsic driving mechanism of disaster occurrence probability on enterprises' reserve decisions. Then, the Stackelberg sequential game framework was further employed to evaluate the effectiveness of government subsidy policies in increasing supply reserve volumes and improving government-enterprise objectives. Furthermore, Bayesian persuasion theory was introduced to design a government information disclosure mechanism, aimed at guiding enterprises' reserve decisions and improving the overall efficiency of relief supply reserves. Finally, a numerical analysis was conducted with flood disasters as a specific application scenario. The research findings indicate that the volume of enterprise-led emergency supply reserves is positively correlated with disaster occurrence probability, reflecting enterprises' sensitivity to disasters. Although government subsidies can increase reserve quantities and reduce government costs, they have limitations in improving enterprises' profits. The information disclosure mechanism designed based on Bayesian persuasion theory outperforms both the baseline model and the subsidy model in terms of reserve quantities, government costs, and enterprises' profits. Through effective disaster information disclosure, the government can enhance the relief efficiency of the enterprise-led emergency supply reserve system.

Key words: enterprise-led reserve system, emergency supply, Bayesian persuasion, option contract, disaster occurrence probability, information disclosure