Government-enterprise joint reserve decision for urban flood control materials considering level of maintenance

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.04.0256

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to scientifically develop the agent storage plan of urban flood control materials, in view of the periodic random occurrence of urban flood disasters, a differential game model was constructed to study the process of government and enterprise joint reserve and continuous maintenance to guarantee the demand for emergency response. Furthermore, the government-enterprise maintenance level models under the single reserve decision of the government, the joint reserve decision of government-enterprises and the Stackelberg decision were established, and the influence of maintenance level on material loss degree and system profit was analyzed. Moreover, Taking Wuhan urban waterlogging 2016 as the background, the simulation analysis was carried out by using Mathematic software. The results show that considering the maintenance level of government and enterprises can effectively reduce the material loss, and the government-enterprise joint reserve decision is better than the Stackelberg decision and the government single reserve decision. Under the government-enterprise joint reserve model, the maintenance level, material stock and total profit of the system can be Pareto optimal.

Key words: urban flood control material, government-enterprise joint reserve decision-making, differential game, Stackelberg game, maintenance level

WANG Zhe, CONG Zihao, LIANG Mengyu, LIU Dan, MA Yong, XIA Xiaotang. Government-enterprise joint reserve decision for urban flood control materials considering level of maintenance[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2023, 33(4): 202-209.

Figures/Tables 6

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影响因素	政府单一储备决策	政企联合储备决策	Stackelberg 决策
更新维护水平	0.37	0.528	0.425
监督维护水平	0	0.70	0.26
物资存量	0. 176	0.51	0.485
成本分担	—	—	0.87
企业利润	6.51	—	19.21
政府成本	86.94	—	41.90
系统总利润	-80.43	-8.64	-22.69