China Safety Science Journal ›› 2026, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (8): 276-286.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2026.08.1589

• Intelligent Safety Technology • Previous Articles     Next Articles

A multi-agent differential game analysis of digital intelligent technology enabling gas safety governance: an industry-university-research perspective

Zhang Hua1,2(), Zhang Zhihui2, Cao Cejun3,**()   

  1. 1 School of Accounting, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
    2 School of Management Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
    3 School of Digital Economy and Management, Sichuan Technology and Business University, Chengdu Sichuan 611745, China
  • Received:2026-04-11 Revised:2026-06-19 Online:2026-08-28 Published:2027-02-28
  • Contact: Cao Cejun

Abstract:

To improve the governance level of urban gas safety management, a three-player differential game model involving upstream enterprises, downstream enterprises, and research institutions was developed under the empowerment of digital and intelligent technologies in gas safety management. Particular attention was paid to the scenario in which the upstream enterprise shared various costs incurred by the downstream enterprise. The equilibrium strategies and profits under four different scenarios were systematically compared, and numerical simulations were conducted to examine the effects of key parameters on the Pareto improvement. The results show that the adoption of digital and intelligent technologies by downstream enterprises not only enhances the level of gas safety but also increases the profits of all participants. Moreover, the implementation of a dual cost-sharing mechanism by the upstream enterprise yields superior Pareto improvements for all members. In addition, demand price elasticity, gas safety management efficiency, and its associated costs significantly affect the upstream and downstream enterprises under the Pareto improvement induced by the dual cost-sharing mechanism, whereas the contribution of digital and intelligent technologies and their investment costs mainly influence the profits of research institutions and the magnitude of the Pareto improvement.

Key words: digital intelligence technology, gas safety management, industry-university-research collabration, differential game, dual cost-sharing

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