Abstract: To improve the situation of work safety of small and medium-sized enterprises in China, the principal-agent relationships between the enterprises and core enterprises in supply chain were analyzed and an incentive contract model was built for safety of small and medium-sized enterprises under the dual task principal-agent framework condition. Incentive parameters, the effort level of small and medium enterprise production and safety tasks and the return of core enterprise were analyzed by using a numerical simulation method. The results show that the incentive of the core enterprise to the production tasks of small and medium-sized enterprises is obviously greater than that to the safety tasks that reducing the safety costs of small and medium-sized enterprises or increasing their safety marginal revenue with core enterprise's help will increase their effort to a greater extent in performing the safety task, and that if a core enterprise helps the small and medium-sized enterprises to reduce their production and safety costs, the core enterprise's own income will increase.

Key words: work safety, dual task principal-agent, incentive contract, supply chain, small and medium-sized enterprise