Abstract:

In order to effectively manage delivery riders' traffic accident risks and reduce road safety incidents during food delivery, a game model was constructed to study the antagonistic yet unified relationship between the interests of food delivery riders and food delivery platforms. The game between food delivery riders and food delivery platforms regarding ″who bears the risk of traffic accidents″ was deeply analyzed, and the game analysis results were used to propose suggestions for optimizing the legal provisions on traffic accident liability of food delivery riders in China. The results show that if the expected loss borne by the delivery rider for the traffic accident risk is less than the expected loss borne by the delivery platform, the delivery platform will not bear the traffic accident risk, and the delivery rider is forced to bear it. If the expected loss borne by the delivery rider is greater than the expected loss borne by the delivery platform, the delivery platform will bear the risk of traffic accidents. If the expected loss borne by both the food delivery rider and the platform is large, and the difference between them is significant, the platform's approaches to managing the traffic accident risk are not conducive to the welfare of the food delivery riders and overall society welfare. In this case, the law should stipulate that the food delivery platform with lower wage levels bears the riders' traffic accident liability, while riders on platforms with higher wage levels bear the liability, so as to maximize the welfare of the delivery riders and overall social welfare.

Key words: delivery rider, traffic accident risk, bearing mechanism, food delivery platform, game model, traffic accident liability