智能化煤矿安全风险多主体动态治理演化博弈研究

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2026.02.0247

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为改善煤矿灾害事故多发的现状,分析智能化煤矿安全风险动态治理中各方主体的博弈行为,构建以政府、煤矿企业与矿工为主体的三方演化博弈模型,分析三方主体之间的演化博弈稳定性,利用演化博弈情境仿真模拟智能化煤矿安全风险治理情境,揭示政府监管力度、收益分摊比例系数等因素对博弈主体策略的影响过程。结果表明:政府部门在监管企业安全风险治理过程中,适当地运用奖惩机制提升企业对安全风险治理的重视程度,有助于节约政府监管成本,扩大政企协同收益;高治理成本会降低企业治理积极性、催生企业的投机行为,需采取激励机制与成本共担策略,减轻企业安全风险治理负担;激励矿工参与治理,降低其参与成本,有助于企业快速识别潜在安全风险,防止灾害事故的发生。

关键词: 智能化煤矿, 煤矿安全风险, 动态治理, 演化博弈, 情境仿真

Abstract:

To improve the current situation of frequent disasters and accidents in coal mines, the game behaviors among various stakeholders in the dynamic governance of intelligent coal mine safety risks were investigated. A tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed involving the government, coal mine enterprises, and miners, to analyze the evolutionary stability among the three parties. Additionally, evolutionary game scenario simulations were employed to mimic the actual context of intelligent coal mine safety risk governance. Through this, the influence processes of factors such as governmental regulatory intensity and benefit-sharing ratio on the strategies of the gaming participants were revealed. The results indicate that governments should appropriately apply reward and punishment mechanisms during the regulation of enterprise safety governance. This approach can enhance corporate attention to safety risk management, reduce regulatory costs, and promote synergistic benefits between government and enterprises. High governance costs tend to reduce corporate enthusiasm for compliance and may encourage opportunistic behavior; therefore, incentive mechanisms and cost-sharing strategies are necessary to alleviate the burden on enterprises. Encouraging miner participation and reducing their involvement costs contribute to faster identification of potential safety risks and help prevent accidents.

Key words: intelligent coal mine, coal mine safety risk, dynamic governance, evolutionary game, scenario simulation

中图分类号:

X936

任利鹏, 佟瑞鹏. 智能化煤矿安全风险多主体动态治理演化博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2026, 36(2): 253-261.

REN Lipeng, TONG Ruipeng. Evolutionary game research on multi-body dynamic governance of intelligent coal mine safety risks[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2026, 36(2): 253-261.

图/表 5

图1

表1

政府、煤矿企业与矿工的博弈支付矩阵

矿工	煤矿企业	政府
矿工	煤矿企业	强监管	弱监管
积极参与	积极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 - a S$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 + (1 - b) C 2 + a S - E 1 - E 2 + e G 2$	$D 1 + D 2 - E 1 - E 2$
		$F 1 - h M 1$	$F 1 - (1 - h) M 1$
	消极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 + a P - G 1 - G 2 - G 3$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 - a P - E 1 - E 3$	$D 1 - E 1 - E 3$
		$- h M 1$	$- (1 - h) M 1$
消极参与	积极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 - a S$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 + (1 - b) C 2 + a S - E 1 - E 2 + e G 2$	$D 1 + D 2 - E 1 - E 2$
		$F 1 - M 2$	$F 1 - M 2$
	消极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 + a P - G 1 - G 2 - G 3$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 - a P - E 1 - E 3$	$D 1 - E 1 - E 3$
		$- M 2$	$- M 2$

表1

表2

系统均衡点及特征值稳定性分析

均衡点	雅可比矩阵特征值	正负	稳定条件	状态
$T 1 (0,0, 0)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c + P a$	$(±, +, +)$	—	鞍点
	$D 2 - E 2 + E 3$
	$M 2 - M 1 + M 1 h$
$T 2 (1,0, 0)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c - P a$	$(±, ±, +)$	—	鞍点
	$C 2 - E 2 + E 3 - C 2 b + G 2 e + P a + S a$
	$M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 3 (0,1, 0)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c - S a$	$(±, -, +)$	—	鞍点
	$E 2 - D 2 - E 3$
	$M 2 - M 1 + M 1 h$
$T 4 (0,0, 1)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c + P a$	$(±, +, -)$	—	鞍点
	$D 2 - E 2 + E 3$
	$M 1 - M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 5 (1,1, 0)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c + S a$	$(±, ±, +)$	—	鞍点
	$E 2 - C 2 - E 3 + C 2 b - G 2 e - P a - S a$
	$M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 6 (1,0, 1)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c - P a$	$(±, ±, -)$	$C 1 + C 2 b + P a > G 1 + G 2 + G 3 + C 1 c$ $E 2 - C 2 - E 3 > G 2 e + P a + S a - C 2 b$ $M 2 > M 1$	ESS
	$C 2 - E 2 + E 3 - C 2 b + G 2 e + P a + S a$
	$M 1 h - M 2$
$T 7 (0,1, 1)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c - S a$	$(±, -, -)$	$G 1 + G 2 + G 3 + C 1 c + S a > C 1 + C 2 b$ $D 2 > E 2 - E 3$ $M 2 > M 1$	ESS
	$E 2 - D 2 - E 3$
	$M 1 - M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 8 (1,1, 1)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c + S a$	$(±, ±, -)$	$C 1 + C 2 b > G 1 + G 2 + G 3 + C 1 c + S a$ $G 2 e + P a + S a - C 2 b > E 2 - C 2 - E 3$ $M 2 > M 1$	ESS
	$E 2 - C 2 - E 3 + C 2 b - G 2 e - P a - S a$
	$M 1 h - M 2$

表2

图2

图3

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