通用航空安全监管演化博弈的系统动力学仿真

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2019.04.008

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2019, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (4): 43-50.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2019.04.008

通用航空安全监管演化博弈的系统动力学仿真

张攀科^1,2 讲师, 罗帆^**1 教授

1 武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉 430070;
2 河南科技大学管理学院,河南洛阳471023

收稿日期:2018-12-12 修回日期:2019-02-05 出版日期:2019-04-28
作者简介:张攀科 (1982—),男,河南南阳人,博士,讲师,主要从事安全管理、风险管理、人力资源管理等方面的研究。E-mail: cnzpk@163.com。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助(71271163);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助(18YJA630076)。

Evolutionary game analysis on safety supervision of general aviation based on system dynamics simulation

ZHANG Panke^1,2, LUO Fan¹

1 School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430070, China;
2 School of Management, Henan University of Science and Technology, Luoyang Henan 471023, China

Received:2018-12-12 Revised:2019-02-05 Published:2019-04-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为探析安全监管机构、通用航空企业、作业层员工在通用航空安全监管中的策略选择规律,基于三方互动关系的概念模型,构建通用航空安全监管演化博弈模型,并分析其稳定策略;采用系统动力学(SD)方法仿真分析在静态监管策略、动态监管策略及外部变量调整条件下的演化博弈过程。结果表明:施行将安全处罚额度与违规概率相关联的动态监管策略时,监管体系存在稳定均衡解;可以通过强化事故追责力度、提高监管奖惩强度、降低安全实现成本等,实现安全监管体系的优化;企业内部奖惩强度要适度,以防安全管理层和作业层员工的共谋违规;要事后追责与过程监管并重,加大过程监管的强度和频度。

关键词: 通用航空, 安全监管, 系统动力学(SD), 作业层员工, 演化博弈

Abstract: In order to explore the rule of strategic choices made by safety regulators, general aviation enterprises and employees in general aviation safety supervision, an evolutionary game model of navigation safety supervision was constructed based on the conceptual model of tripartite interaction and its stability strategy was analyzed. The evolutionary game process under static and dynamic supervision strategy and external variable adjustment was simulated and analyzed by SD method. The results show that there exists a stable equilibrium solution in the supervisory system when implementing the dynamic supervisory strategy that links the safety penalty quota with the probability of violation, that the optimization of the safety supervisory system can be achieved by strengthening the intensity of accident recovery, increasing the intensity of rewards and punishments, and reducing the cost of safety realization, that the intensity of rewards and punishments within enterprises should be moderate to prevent the violation by management and operational staff in collusion, that we should lay equal stress on both accountability and process supervision, and increase the intensity and frequency of process supervision.

Key words: general aviation, safety supervision, system dynamics(SD), operational staff, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

X949

张攀科, 罗帆. 通用航空安全监管演化博弈的系统动力学仿真[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2019, 29(4): 43-50.

ZHANG Panke, LUO Fan. Evolutionary game analysis on safety supervision of general aviation based on system dynamics simulation[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2019, 29(4): 43-50.

参考文献

[1] 罗渝川,韩新营,罗晓利. 2006—2015年间中国民航事故及事故征候的统计分析[J]. 中国民航飞行学院学报, 2018,29(3): 21-24.
LUO Yuchuan, HAN Xinying, LUO Xiaoli. Statistic analysis based on accidents and incidents of China civil aviation during 2006-2015 [J]. Journal of Civil Aviation Flight University of China, 2018,29(3): 21-24.
[2] RASMUSSEN J. Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem [J]. Safety Science,1997, 27(2/3): 183-213.
[3] 王文轲,蔡洁,陈曾洁,等.民航安全监管中的多方演化博弈研究[J].中国安全科学学报,2016,26(1): 136-141.
WANG Wenke,CAI Jie, CHEN Zengjie, et al. Research on multi-parties evolutionary game in civil aviation safety supervision [J].China Safety Science Journal,2016,26(1): 136-141.
[4] 程敏, 朱前程, 董大旻. 基于系统动力学的建筑安全监管博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2011, 21(12): 73-81.
CHENG Min, ZHU Qiancheng, DONG Damin. Game study on construction safety supervision based on system dynamics [J].China Safety Science Journal, 2011, 21(12): 73-81.
[5] 王循庆,李勇建,孙晓羽.基于演化博弈的危化品安全监管情景推演研究[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2017,13(1): 115-121.
WANG Xunqing, LI Yongjian, SUN Xiaoyu. Study on scenario inference of hazardous chemicals safety supervision based on evolutionary game[J]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2017,13(1): 115-121.
[6] 赵贤利, 罗帆. 基于系统动力学的跑道侵入风险演化博弈研究[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(2): 73-79.
ZHAO Xianli, LUO Fan. A research on evolutionary game of runway incursion risks based on system dynamics [J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2015, 18(2): 73-79.
[7] 李科宏,张亚东,郭进.高铁运营安全监督系统奖惩机制优化研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2018,18(5): 18-25.
LI Kehong, ZHANG Yadong, GUO Jin. Optimization of reward and punishment mechanism for high-speed railway operation safety supervision system[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2018,18(5): 18-25.
[8] REASON J. Managing the risks of organizational accidents[M]. London: Routledge, 1997: 9-12.
[9] STROEVE S H, SHARPANSKYKH A, KIRWAN B. Agent-based organizational modelling for analysis of safety culture at an air navigation service provider[J]. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2011, 96(5): 515-533.
[10] 贾璐. 基于SD的工程建设安全监管演化博弈研究[J]. 南昌大学学报:工科版,2012,34(1): 42-48.
JIA Lu. Study on the evolutionary game for project construction safety regulation based on system dynamics model [J]. Journal of Nanchang University:Engineering & Technology,2012,34(1): 42-48.

[1]	江新, 张腾飞, 陈婧, 赵力, 邱国坤, 王辉. 复杂系统视角下洞室施工人员安全认知仿真研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2024, 34(2): 22-30.
[2]	邓青, 周郑, 邓立, 蒋慧灵, 周亮, 周正青. 存在逆行人员的疏散模型构建及稳定性分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(9): 196-203.
[3]	邵舒羽, 刘艳, 王晴, 张诗可, 刘若阳. 非常规突发事件下应急物资储备政企协同演化博弈[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(4): 210-220.
[4]	席永涛, 张靓, 付姗姗, 胡甚平, 韩冰. 基于SFN-SD的北极冰区船舶航行风险传递路径研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(4): 52-60.
[5]	董昌其, 刘纪达, 赵泽斌. TOE框架下消防安全监管能力组态路径分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(3): 153-160.
[6]	李小莉, 曹策俊, 刘伟华, 张帆顺. 考虑传染概率的政府防疫管控策略演化仿真[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(3): 42-50.
[7]	黄静洋, 潘璇, 付小蓉, 高健伟, 潘卫军. 中低空通用航空飞行计划安全风险评估[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(12): 23-30.
[8]	陈述, 尹佳, 邵波, 陈云, 王越. 安全生产服务机构参与的建筑安全监管演化博弈[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(12): 8-15.
[9]	潘卫军, 覃莉茹, 骆晨, 黄园晶. 通用航空森林消防救援数据适配性特征提取[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(11): 67-74.
[10]	程伟. 我国高铁安全监管问题现状及对策研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(S1): 34-38.
[11]	谢露强, 王海燕. 基于系统动力学的邮轮建造施工进度风险演化研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(S1): 63-71.
[12]	王晓庆, 陈东, 王安娜, 钱城江. 基于系统动力学的城市安全重点风险管控机制[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(10): 31-39.
[13]	王庆. 委托代理理论视角下特种设备安全监管改进研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(1): 20-26.
[14]	曹策俊, 朱彦青, 张帆顺, 李小莉, 杨琴. 考虑信任的公私合作监管演化博弈分析:以新冠病毒医疗垃圾管理为例^*[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2021, 31(7): 38-47.
[15]	江新, 李雪莲, 吴静涵, 李炜, 罗东立, 费凡. 敏感性水利工程社会稳定风险演化SD模型[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2021, 31(4): 18-26.

通用航空安全监管演化博弈的系统动力学仿真

Evolutionary game analysis on safety supervision of general aviation based on system dynamics simulation

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics

本文评价