Improved CPT based analysis of change in miners' HVB

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2017.07.003

Abstract

Abstract: To explore the change of HVB, from the perspective of evolutionary game, using the improved CPT, a payment matrix was constructed for HVB miners and safety supervisors. By considering interests of both the sides and introducing incentive compensation as variables, a model was built for the influence of reward change on miners' HVB transformation. Taking Wangzhuang coal mine as an example, the Matlab was used to verify the effectiveness of the measures. The results show that the evolutionary game based on improved CPT can effectively explore the process of change of miner HVB,that only when 4 constraint inequalities are met at the same time can the safety level reach the highest level,that under certain conditions, the higher the salary incentive degree is, the lower the probability of miners' violation behavior will be,and that improving the risk perception ability and raising the salary level of miners are helpful to reduce the occurrence of miners' HBV behavior and raise the safety management level of coal mine.

Key words: cumulative prospect theory(CPT), habitual violation behavior(HVB), perceived benefits maxtrix, evolutionary game, numerical simulation

CLC Number:

X910

LIU Yuxin, LI Jizu, FENG Guorui, KANG Lixun. Improved CPT based analysis of change in miners' HVB[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2017, 27(7): 13-17.

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