Abstract: In the construction industry,there is a consensus among researchers and practitioners that construction workers have a little safety skillset.Aspects influencing firm' decision to provide safety skills training and construction worker's willingness to engage in this training program were explored through the lens of evolutionary game theory.What firm and worker focuse on were identified,and then a model was built for evolutionary game under the condition of government intervention,in which a dynamic relationship between firm's intent to offer a safety skill training program and worker's intent to attend that training program,was framed.Three ESSs were demonstrated for 9 game cases,as well as the requirements of every ESS.The results show that in the absence of government intervention,firm can not be expected to offer safety skills training to workers.In the case of government intervention,firm offers willfully a training program only when it benefits from that training,and as for workers,they are found to proactively engage in such a training program on the condition that they gain much more,not just a little,benefits.

Key words: construction worker, safety skill training, government, evolutionary game theory, evolutionary steady strategy (ESS)