Government-enterprise cooperative evolutionary game of emergency material reserve under unconventional emergency events

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.04.0952

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to effectively reduce the loss of emergency materials under the coordinated management of government-enterprise, and based on the characteristics of collaborative management mechanism, firstly, the influence of factors on government-enterprise evolution game decision-making was considered, from aspects of collaborative management cost, government subsidy, enterprise prospect profit and loss, government punishment and other factors. Then, the co-evolution game model of the government-enterprise emergency material reserve under unconventional emergencies was constructed. The influence of different behavior of government and enterprise on emergency material reserves under conventional environments and unconventional emergencies was verified by simulation, and the enterprise behavior strategy and evolution stability were explored. And the factors that affect the behavior decision-making of both government and enterprise are analyzed. The effectiveness of the model was verified by simulation. The results indicate that appropriate economic incentives can not only improve the efficiency of emergency materials reserve, but also encourage enterprises to take the initiative to assume social responsibility, stimulate enterprises to take the lead in the implementation of the emergency mechanism, and reduce the coordination cost of enterprises participating in emergency materials reserves. Improving the long-term economic and social benefits brought by enterprises' implementing emergency materials reserves is conducive to improving the ability to deal with unconventional emergencies. When the costs and benefits of the two players meet certain conditions, the system will evolve to a stable state.

Key words: unconventional emergency, emergency materials reserve, government-enterprise cooperation, evolutionary game, collaborative management

SHAO Shuyu, LIU Yan, WANG Qing, ZHANG Shike, LIU Ruoyang. Government-enterprise cooperative evolutionary game of emergency material reserve under unconventional emergency events[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2023, 33(4): 210-220.

Figures/Tables 13

Tab.1

Payoff matrix of government-enterprise game under government regulation

博弈双方		企业e
博弈双方		协同管理	不协同管理
政府g	协同管理	$P 1 + a 1 Q + γ β M - U 1 - ε K 1, P 2 + a 2 Q + (1 - γ) β M - U 2 - ε K 2$	P₁-U₁-εK₁,P₂+N₂
政府g	不协同管理	P₁+N₁,P₂-U₂-εK₂	P₁,P₂

Tab.1

Tab.2

Fig.1

Tab.3

Opportunity cost-payoff matrix of government-enterprise game under non-cooperative management mechanism

博弈双方		企业e
博弈双方		协同管理	不协同管理
政府g	协同管理	0, 0	0, $a 2 Q + (1 - γ) β M - U 2 - ε K 2 + α U 2 + (1 - η) b J - N 2 + m f$
政府g	不协同管理	$a 1 Q + γ β M - U 1 - ε K 1 + α U 1 + η b J - N 1 + m f$ , 0	αU₁-U₁-εK₁,αU₂-U₂-εK₂

Tab.3

Tab.4

Payoff matrix of government-enterprise game under cooperative management mechanism

博弈双方		企业e
博弈双方		协同管理	不协同管理
政府g	协同管理	$P 1 + a 1 Q + γ β M - U 1 - ε K 1 + α U 1 + η b J, P 2 + a 2 Q + (1 - γ) β M - U 2 - ε K 2 + α U 2 + (1 - η) b J$	$P 1 - U 1 - ε K 1 + α U 1, P 2 + N 2 - m f$
政府g	不协同管理	P₁+N₁-mf,P₂-U₂-εK₂+αU₂	P₁,P₂

Tab.4

Tab.5

Tab.6

Fig.2

Fig.3

Fig.4

Fig.5

Fig.6

Fig.7

References 17

[1]	范维澄, 霍红, 杨列勋, 等. “非常规突发事件应急管理研究”重大研究计划结题综述[J]. 中国科学基金, 2018, 32(3): 59-67.
	FAN Weicheng, HUO Hong, YANG Liexun, et al. Review of the achievements of major research plan on "study on unconventional emergencies management"[J]. Bulletin of National Natural Science Foundation of China, 2018, 32(3): 59-67.
[2]	XU Zhe, SHI Lei, WANG Yijin, et al. Pathological findings of COVID-19 associated with acute respiratory distress syndrome[J]. The Lancet Respiratory Medicine, 2020, 8(4): 420-422. doi: 10.1016/S2213-2600(20)30076-X
[3]	丁斌, 桂斌. 基于合作博弈的预付条件下应急物资库存策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2011, 20(3): 60-65.
	DING Bin, GUI Bin. On emergency material inventory strategy under pre-payment based on cooperative game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2011, 20(3): 60-65.
[4]	HU Zhongquan, TIAN Jun, FENG Gengzhong. A relief supplies purchasing model based on a put option contract[J]. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 2019, 127: 253-262. doi: 10.1016/j.cie.2018.12.015
[5]	刘阳, 田军, 冯耕中, 等. 供应商风险规避下基于期权契约的政企联合储备应急物资模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(11): 102-111.
	LIU Yang, TIAN Jun, FENG Gengzhong, et al. The model of joint relief supplies reserves of the government and a risk-averse supplier based on an option contract[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(11): 102-111.
[6]	梁瑾璠, 赵晗萍, 张家乐. 应急物资供应链快速构建模式[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(4): 135-140. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.04.020
	LIANG Jinfan, ZHAO Hanping, ZHANG Jiale. Rapid construction mode of emergency material supply chain[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2022, 32(4): 135-140. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.04.020
[7]	龚英, 何彦婷, 曹策俊. 面向重大公共卫生风险治理的应急物流协同演化仿真[J]. 计算机应用, 2021, 41(9):2754-2760. doi: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2020111728
	GONG Ying, HE Yanting, CAO Cejun. Co-evolutionary simulation regarding emergency logistics in major public health risk governance[J]. Journal of Computer Applications, 2021, 41(9): 2754-2760. doi: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2020111728
[8]	DEO S, GURVICH I. Centralized vs. decentralized ambulance diversion: a network perspective[J]. Management Science, 2011, 57(7): 1300-1319. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1342
[9]	郑彦辉, 朱昌锋, 王庆荣, 等. 考虑有限理性的应急物资博弈调配双目标优化[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2020, 30(11): 168-174. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2020.11.025
	ZHENG Yanhui, ZHU Changfeng, WANG Qingrong, et al. Bi-objective optimization of emergency material game allocation considering limited rationality[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2020, 30(11): 168-174. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2020.11.025
[10]	艾云飞, 吕靖, 王军, 等. 应急物资政企联合储备合作机理研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(5): 126-131. doi: 10.12005/orms.2015.0168
	AI Yunfei, LYU Jing, WANG Jun, et al. The study of cooperation mechanism between government and enterprises in emergency supplies reserve[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(5): 126-131. doi: 10.12005/orms.2015.0168
[11]	张琳, 田军, 冯耕中. 基于柔性契约的政府应急物资采购模型研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(5): 53-61. doi: 10.12005/orms.2017.0108
	ZHANG Lin, TIAN Jun, FENG Gengzhong. Government emergency supplies procurement model based on flexible contract[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(5): 53-61. doi: 10.12005/orms.2017.0108
[12]	王芹, 高志军, 徐最, 等. 突发事件影响下应急物资的库存管理策略[J]. 上海海事大学学报, 2018, 39(1): 80-84.
	WANG Qin, GAO Zhijun, XU Zui, et al. Inventory management strategy of emergency materials under influence of emergencies[J]. Journal of Shanghai Maritime University, 2018, 39(1): 80-84.
[13]	刘艳, 钱坤, 张艳萍. 时空需求差异下应急物资预储系统构建及仿真[J]. 系统工程, 2021, 39(6): 58-69.
	LIU Yan, QIAN Kun, ZHANG Yanping. Construction and simulation of emergency material pre-storage system under space-time demand difference[J]. Systems Engineering, 2021, 39(6): 58-69.
[14]	傅正堂, 董沛武, 李周秩, 等. 突发公共卫生事件下疫情防控与医疗物资协同保障研究[J]. 工业工程与管理, 2021, 26(3): 8-17.
	FU Zhengtang, DONG Peiwu, LI Zhouzhi, et al. Research on medical materials synergetic supports for epidemic controlling in public health emergency[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2021, 26(3): 8-17.
[15]	KLEIN M, DEISSENROTH M. When do households invest in solar photovoltaics? an application of prospect theory[J]. Energy Policy, 2017, 109: 270-278. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.06.067
[16]	高晓宁, 田军, 臧国全, 等. 应急物资委托代储系统跨期激励的契约设计与管理策略研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2021, 35(1): 220-230.
	GAO Xiaoning, TIAN Jun, ZANG Guoquan, et al. Design of the intertemporal incentive contract on the agent emergency supplies reservation system and management strategies for government[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2021, 35(1): 220-230.
[17]	李晟, 丰景春, 吴凯丽, 等. 政企联合储备应急物资的激励决策[J]. 系统管理学报, 2022, 31(5): 840-850.
	LI Sheng, FENG Jingchun, WU Kaili, et al. Incentive decision of government-enterprise joint reserve of emergency supplies[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2022, 31(5): 840-850.

均衡点	Det(L)	Tr(L)	局部稳定性
O(0,0)	+	-	稳定策略
A(1,0)	+	+	不稳定
B(1,1)	+	-	稳定策略
C(0,1)	+	+	不稳定
D(g^,e^)	-	0	鞍点

均衡点	Det(L)	Tr(L)	局部稳定性
O(0,0)	+	-	稳定策略
A(1,0)	+	+	不稳定
B(1,1)	+	-	稳定策略
C(0,1)	+	+	不稳定
D(g^,e^)	-	0	鞍点

N₁,N₂	Q	K₁,K₂	a₁,a₂	γ	ε	M	β	α	η	b	J	m	f	U₁,U₂
额外收益	影响程度	前景损益	技术收益	分配系数	损益障碍因子	信息量	成熟度	政府成本补贴力度	分配系数	社会效益系数	奖励基数	监管度	罚金	协同管理成本
2,4	20	5,2	1,0.6	0.2	0.7	20	1	0.7	0.8	1	5	0.8	5	10,6