Clustering and correlation analysis of factors causing cross operation accidents in construction

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2025.03.0717

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to effectively prevent cross operation accidents in the construction process, firstly, 130 cross operation accident cases nationwide from 2010 to 2022 were collected as research objects, and an evaluation system for cross operation in construction was established based on the grounded theory. Then, according to the relationship between the indicators, a spectral clustering algorithm was used to analyze the combination of accident causes. The weight of each cause factor was allocated, and different levels of risk were divided by principal component analysis and analytic hierarchy process. Finally, the Apriori algorithm was used to obtain the correlation chain of each factor in the causative combination. The results show that the evaluation system includes 5 core categories, 13 main categories and 40 categories. The core category that has the greatest influence on the risk of cross operation in the construction process is technical management. The 40 categories are grouped into 4 causa l combinations, among which 1 is high risk, 1 is medium risk, and 2 are low risk. In addition, for the complex cluster of factors, the key combination of causes is identified and targeted preventive measures are proposed to reduce the probability of cross-operation accidents.

Key words: construction work, cross operation, accident cause, cause factor, spectral clustering, association rule

CLC Number:

X948

LIU Qingfeng, HU Changming, ZHAO Jiangping. Clustering and correlation analysis of factors causing cross operation accidents in construction[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2025, 35(3): 142-150.

Figures/Tables 13

Table 1

Fig.1

Fig.2

Fig.3

Table 2

Fig.4

Table 3

Table 4

Table 5

Fig.5

Fig.6

Fig.7

Table 6

Causes analysis of accident cases

交叉作业类型	事故责任分析	致因因素提取	因素转换
作业A:门框安装作业	未按规定设立安全生产管理机构	A-H11安全管理机构不健全	H11、H12、H22、H31、H32、H41、M12、T12、T13、T14、T21、T22、T31、T32、T33、T34、T35、C12、C21、C22、C24、E21、E22
	ICU改造工程未按规定申请施工许可证和开工登记手续	A-H12施工手续缺失或作假
	未配备专职安全生产管理人员	A-H22专职安全人员不足
	现场巡查值班人员证书未达到相应资质等级	A-H31无证上岗
	施工现场未聘用工程监理	A-H41监理人员不足
	固定消防设施失效,消火栓系统管网无水	A-T33安全防护装置缺失
	未发现西北门外坡道的易燃材料着火未提前消除安全隐患	A-T22未消除安全隐患
	未根据施工现场实际情况制定施工方案	A-T13施工方案未编制
	未对作业人员开展安全生产教育和培训	A-T31安全培训不到位
	未进行针对性技术交底	A-T14技术交底不到位
	未办理动火审批、对现场可燃物清理的情况擅自开展切割作业	A-T12更改工艺流程
	未配有专人值守,现场无人监护	A-T34施工过程监督缺失
	开展自流平地面施工和净化门门框安装切割动火时违规交叉作业	A-T35违规指挥作业
	两家分包在同一区域作业时未沟通协调造成交叉干扰	A-C12未签订安全生产协议
	个人借用他人公司资质承揽工程	A-C21挂靠
	未经建设单位允许将工程私发给无承揽资质的个人	A-C22违法分包
	施工区和非施工区之间未进行防火分隔	A-E21未设置警戒区
作业B:自流平地面施工	环氧树脂涂料属于易燃物品,在储存和放置过程中未按规定进行	B-M12危险材料管理不严
	危险区域内违规调料施工	B-H32安全意识淡薄
	已知材料为易燃易爆物品,现场仍未保持有效通风	B-T32现场安全检查不到位
	未配有专人值守,现场无人监护	B-T34施工过程监督缺失
	总承包单位与自流平地面分包之间无合同	B-C24权责划分不明确
	未将残留的环氧树脂底涂材料清理干净,忽视其可能造成的危害	B-T21危险源辨识不充分
	作业区域内存在动火作业,未将危险源转移到安全区域	B-E22施工安全间距
	开展自流平地面施工和净化门门框安装切割动火时违规交叉作业	B-T35违规指挥作业

Table 6

References 19

[1]	YEO C, BHANDARI J, ABBASSI R, et al. Dynamic risk analysis of offloading process in floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform using Bayesian network[J]. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2016,41:259-269.
[2]	AKINCI B, FISCHEN M, LEVITT R, et al. Formalization and automation of time-space conflict analysis[J]. Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering, 2002, 16(2):124-134.
[3]	MOON H, DAWOOD N, KANG L, et al. Development of workspace conflict visualization system using 4D object of work schedule[J]. Advanced Engineering Informatics, 2014, 28(1):50-65.
[4]	胡超, 赵春菊, 周宜红, 等. 高拱坝仓面施工时空冲突分析与调整方法研究[J]. 水力发电学报, 2017, 36(5):19-27.
	HU Chao, ZHAO Chunju, ZHOU Yihong, et al. Time-space conflict analysis and adjustment methods for pouring concrete of higharch dams[J]. Journal of Hydroelectric Engineering, 2017, 36(5):19-27.
[5]	王建平, 聂本武, 李智. 三峡升船机立体交叉作业的风险控制措施研究[J]. 安全与环境工程, 2013, 20(1):147-150.
	WANG Jianping, NIE Benwu, LI Zhi. Research on the risk control countermeasures of the grade separation operation of ship lift in three gorges[J]. Safety and Environmental Engineering, 2013, 20(1):147-150.
[6]	江新, 吴园莉. 水电工程项目群交叉作业风险演化机理研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2015, 25(12):157-163.
	JIANG Xin, WU Yuanli. Research on evolution mechanisms of risks in hydropower project group cross operation[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2015, 25(12):157-163.
[7]	屈静, 张明星, 张明, 等. 基于压气站场的交叉作业安全风险评价模型研究[J]. 安全与环境学报, 2022, 22(3):1163-1169.
	QU Jing, ZHANG Mingxing, ZHANG Ming, et al. Research on the safety risk control mode of compressor field based on cross operation[J]. Journal of Safety and Environment, 2022, 22(3):1163-1169.
[8]	ROZENFELD O, SACKS R, ROSENFELD Y, et al. Construction job safety analysis[J]. Safety Science, 2010, 48(4):491-498.
[9]	应急管理部办公厅. 生产安全事故调查报告编制指南(试行)[EB/OL]. (2023-03-16). https://www.mem.gov.cn/gk/zfxxgkpt/fdzdgknr/202303/t20230316_444990.shtml.
[10]	方雪, 谢朝武, 黄锐. 扎根理论下国内漂流旅游安全事故成因机制[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(4):23-29. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.04.004
	FANG Xue, XIE Chaowu, HUANG Rui. Formation mechanism of safety accidents in domestic drifting tourism based on GT[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2022, 32(4):23-29. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.04.004
[11]	闫淑敏, 杨小丽. 基于扎根理论的高校科研人员创新动力研究[J]. 科技管理研究, 2019, 39(1):39-45.
	YAN Shumin, YANG Xiaoli. Research on innovation motivation of scientific research personnel in colleges and universities based on grounded theory[J]. Science and Technology Management Research, 2019,39(1): 39-45.
[12]	AYHAN B U, DOĞAN N B, TOKDEMIR O B. An association rule mining model for the assessment of the correlations between the attributes of severe accidents[J]. Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 2020,26(4):315-330.
[13]	周林, 平西建, 徐森, 等. 基于谱聚类的聚类集成算法[J]. 自动化学报, 2012, 38(8):1335-1342.
	ZHOU Lin, PING Xijian, XU Sen, et al. Cluster ensemble based on spectral clustering[J]. Acta Automatica Sinica, 2012, 38(8):1335-1342.
[14]	梅睿, 吕志勇, 顾文, 等. 基于主成分分析和谱聚类的短期风功率预测[J]. 现代电力, 2023, 40(1):35-41.
	MEI Rui, LYU Zhiyong, GU Wen, et al. Short-term wind power prediction based on principal component analysis and spectral clustering[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2023, 40(1):35-41.
[15]	胡长明, 刘一衡, 黄华, 等. AHP-改进物元法在整体钢平台顶升模架体系安全风险评估中的应用[J]. 安全与环境学报, 2024, 24(1):33-41.
	HU Changming, LIU Yiheng, HUANG Hua, et al. Application of AHP improved matter-element method in safety risk assessment of integral steel platform jacking formwork system[J]. Journal of Safety and Environment, 2024, 24(1):33-41.
[16]	KAPLAN S G B J. On the quantitative definition of risk[J]. Risk Analysis, 1981, 1(1):11-27.
[17]	郑彬彬, 冯婷婷, 王佳贺, 等. 基于文本挖掘的城镇燃气事故致因及关联分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2023, 33(7):190-195. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.07.1644
	ZHENG Binbin, FENG Tingting, WANG Jiahe, et al. Causes and correlation analysis of urban gas accidents based on text mining[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2023, 33(7):190-195. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.07.1644
[18]	李鑫, 阳富强. 危化品事故人为因素关联规则挖掘与分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2022, 32(11):134-139. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.11.2387
	LI Xin, YANG Fuqiang. Human factor association rules mining and analysis for hazardous chemical accidents[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2022, 32(11):134-139. doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.11.2387
[19]	应急管理部. 北京丰台长峰医院“4·18”重大火灾事故调查报告[EB/OL]. (2023-10-25). https://www.mem.gov.cn/gk/zfxxgkpt/fdzdgknr/202310/t20231025_466731.shtml.

核心范畴 (选择性编码)	主范畴 (主轴编码)	范畴化 (开放性编码)
人员与组织配置	安全管理机构H1	安全管理机构不健全H11;施工手续缺失或作假H12
	安全管理人员H2	备案项目负责人长期不在岗H21;专职安全人员不足H22
	作业人员H3	无证上岗H31;安全意识淡薄H32;身心状态H33;专业技能水平不足H34
	监理人员H4	监理人员不足H41;监理不作为H42
材料设备	材料M1	材料的数量和质量M11;危险材料管理不严M12;安全防护用具缺失M13
材料设备	机械设备M2	支撑体系强度不足M21;设备故障M22;设备警告标识M23
技术管理	施工方案T1	设计图缺陷T11;更改工艺流程T12;施工方案未编制论证T13;技术交底不规范T14
	危险源管理T2	危险源辨识不充分T21;未消除安全隐患T22
	现场安全管理T3	安全培训不到位T31;现场安全检查不到位T32;安全防护缺失T33; 施工过程监督缺失T34;违规指挥作业T35
合同管理	合同协议C1	工期压力C11;未签订安全生产协议C12
合同管理	承包问题C2	挂靠C21;违法分包C22;工作范围不明确C23;权责划分不明确C24
环境条件	自然环境E1	水文地质条件E11;不良天气E12
	施工环境E2	未设置警戒区E21;施工安全间距E22;材料设备摆放混乱E23;临时荷载过大E24;临时用电不规范E25

编号	数量	致因因素	风险等级
簇1	7	H32、H22、T14、T22、T31、T33、T34	三级(高)
簇2	13	H11、H21、H33、H34、H41、M11、M22、C11、C23、C24、E24、E11、E12	二级(中等)
簇3	10	T32、C12、T13、M23、M13、M12、E21、E22、E23、E25	一级(低)
簇4	10	H12、T21、H31、C21、T12、T11、H42、C22、T35、M21	一级(低)

因素	F₁	F₂	F₃
专职安全人员不足	0.65	0.10	0.05
技术交底不规范	0.55	0.08	0.02
安全管理机构不健全	0.10	0.50	0.05
项目负责人缺岗	0.12	0.60	0.08
施工过程监督缺失	0.05	0.20	0.55
安全培训不到位	0.08	0.18	0.60

因素	F₁	F₂	F₃
F₁(专职安全人员不足)	1	2	3
F₂(安全管理机构不健全)	0.5	1	2
F₃(施工过程监督缺失)	0.33	0.5	1

因素	F₁	F₂	F₃
F₁(专职安全人员不足)	0.546	0.571	0.5
F₂(安全管理机构不健全)	0.273	0.286	0.333
F₃(施工过程监督缺失)	0.18	0.143	0.167