Abstract:

In order to improve the emergency management ability and effect of local governments and promote the modernization of emergency management systems and capacity, the game theory was used to construct a game model. The evolutionary game relationship between audit institutions, local governments and surrounding governments was discussed. The root causes of the three were explored through model stability analysis and numerical simulation. Corresponding countermeasures and suggestions were put forward according to the analysis results. The results show that the benefit of emergency management is the key to the evolution of the behavior of local governments and surrounding governments. In addition, the probability of active supervision by audit institutions and the size of audit costs have an impact on the behavior choices of the two governments, and the willingness of the two governments to participate in emergency management also has an impact on each other. For audit institutions, the cost of auditing and the degree of accountability are key factors that influence their behavioral choices.

Key words: emergencies, emergency management audit, local government, audit institutions, evolutionary game