System dynamics analysis of online public opinion governance for chemical emergencies under evolutionary games

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2025.02.2066

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to strengthen the governance of online public opinion of chemical emergencies and properly handle the online public opinion crisis caused by chemical emergencies, evolutionary game theory was introduced into the process of network public opinion governance, and a binary evolutionary game model was constructed for local government and network media. Combined with the SD model, a quantitative analysis model was constructed for local governments and online media. Simulation research was conducted based on relevant cases, and the strategic evolution process of each game subject was compared and analyzed. The results indicate that the popularity of online public opinion on chemical emergencies depends on the strategic choices of each party, and the evolutionary game model analysis shows a periodic and recurrent trend. After introducing a punishment mechanism, appropriately increasing the severity of punishment can bring the evolutionary game system into a benign state. Local governments can enhance the emergency warning mechanism for online public opinion, strengthen daily supervision and collaborative governance of online media, and formulate reasonable punishment measures to effectively prevent local governments from inaction and disorderly behavior in the process of responding to chemical emergencies and online public opinion. This can achieve supervision of online media and avoid the vicious evolution of online public opinion.

Key words: evolutionary game, chemical emergencies, network public opinion governance, system dynamics (SD), local government, online media

CLC Number:

WANG Xiaoqing, CHEN Kebing, QIAN Chengjiang, SONG Jian. System dynamics analysis of online public opinion governance for chemical emergencies under evolutionary games[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2025, 35(2): 95-103.

Figures/Tables 12

Fig.1

Table 1

Table 2

Determinant and trace of local equilibrium points

(X,Y)	矩阵的行列式(det J₁)	矩阵的迹(tr J₁)
P₁(0,0)	(B+D-C+αE+αF)(G-H-αI+αJ)	(B+D-C+αE+αF)+(G-H-αI+αJ)
P₂(0,1)	(B-C)[-(G-H-αI+αJ)]	(B-C)+[-(G-H-αI+αJ)]
P₃(1,0)	(D+G-H)[-(B+D-C+αE+αF)]	(D+G-H)-(B+D-C+αE+αF)
P₄(1,1)	[-(B-C)][-(D+G-H)]	-(D+G-H)-(B-C)
P₅(X^,Y^)	$(α J - α I + G - H) (H - D - G) (B + D - C + α E + α F) (B - C) (D + α E + α F) (α J - α I - D)$	0

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Table 5

Determinant and trace of introducing punishment mechanism for local equilibrium points

(X,Y)	矩阵的行列式(det J₁)	矩阵的迹(tr J₁)
P₁(0,0)	(B+D-C+αE+αF+K)(G-H-αI+ΑJ+K)	(B+D-C+αE+αF+K)+ (G-H-αI+αJ+K)
P₂(0,1)	(B-C+K)[-(G-H-αI+αJ+K)]	(B-C+K)+ [-(G-H-αI+αJ+K)]
P₃(1,0)	(D+G-H+K)[-(B+D-C+αE+αF+K)]	(D+G-H+K)- (B+D-C+αE+αF+K)
P₄(1,1)	[-(B-C+K)][-(D+G-H+K)]	-(D+G-H+K)- (B-C+K)
P₅(X^,Y^)	$(α J - α I + G - H + K) (H - D - G + K) (B + D - C + α E + α F + K) (B - C + K) (D + α E + α F) (α J - α I - D)$	0

Table 5

Table 6

Fig.2

Fig.3

Fig.4

Fig.5

Fig.6

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博弈主体	地方政府
网络媒体	监管或应对策略	积极监管X	消极监管1-X
	积极应对Y	(A+B-C,G-H)	(A,G-H)
	消极应对1-Y	(B+D-C,-D)	[α(-E-F), α(I-J)]

(X,Y)	det J₁	tr J₁	分析结果
P₁(0,0)	+	-	ESS
P₂(0,1)	-	不确定	鞍点
P₃(1,0)	-	+	鞍点
P₄(1,1)	+	+	不稳定点
P₅(X^,Y^)	不确定	0	不稳定点

博弈主体	地方政府
网络媒体	监管或应对策略	积极监管X	消极监管1-X
	积极应对Y	(A+B-C, G-H)	(A-K,G-H)
	消极应对1-Y	(B+D-C, -D-K)	[α(-E-F)-K, α(I-J)-K]

(X,Y)	det J₁	tr J₁	分析结果
P₁(0,0)	+	+	不稳定点
P₂(0,1)	-	不确定	鞍点
P₃(1,0)	-	不确定	鞍点
P₄(1,1)	+	-	ESS
P₅(X^,Y^)	不确定	0	不稳定点