中国安全科学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10): 68-75.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2021.10.010

• 安全工程技术 • 上一篇    下一篇

隧道至互通小间距路段车辆换道博弈行为研究*

尚婷1 副教授, 吴鹏1, 唐伯明2 教授, 白婧荣2, 周亮宇1   

  1. 1 重庆交通大学 交通运输学院,重庆 400074;
    2 重庆交通大学 土木工程学院,重庆 400074
  • 收稿日期:2021-07-02 修回日期:2021-09-16 出版日期:2021-10-28 发布日期:2022-04-28
  • 作者简介:尚 婷 (1983—),女,重庆人,博士,副教授,主要从事道路交通安全、驾驶行为特性、公路景观与文化等方面的研究。E-mail:335304854@qq.com。
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市科技局基础与前沿面上项目(cstc2019jcyj-msxmX0695);重庆市教育委员会青年科技项目(KJQN201900722);重庆市中小学创新人才培养工程项目计划(CY200704);重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYB20181)。

Study on lane-changing game behavior of vehicles in small spacing section between tunnel and interchange

SHANG Ting1, WU Peng1, TANG Boming2, BAI Jingrong2, ZHOU Liangyu1   

  1. 1 School of Traffic & Transportation, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China;
    2 School of Civil Engineering, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing, 400074, China
  • Received:2021-07-02 Revised:2021-09-16 Online:2021-10-28 Published:2022-04-28

摘要: 为定量研究山区高速公路隧道至互通式立交出口小间距路段车辆强制性换道行为,提出符合强制换道行为特性的换道博弈模型。首先,分析匝车辆的换道流程以及换道决策特性;然后,考虑驾驶风格因素对换道行为的影响,引入不完全信息动态博弈理论,建立出匝车辆与目标车道后随车辆交互的换道博弈模型,在考虑换道博弈过程中博弈主体时间性以及安全性收益的基础上,建立换道博弈收益矩阵,并求得混同于强制换道策略的精炼贝叶斯均衡;最后,通过Netlogo仿真平台验证换道博弈模型有效性。研究结果表明:不同驾驶风格出匝车辆驾驶人强制换道、目标车道后方车辆驾驶人减速让行是最优换道策略;不同驾驶风格驾驶人换道完成点距互通出口的距离有显著差异,激进型驾驶人换道完成点距出口的距离普遍大于谨慎型驾驶人。

关键词: 隧道至互通, 小间距, 驾驶行为, 强制换道, 信号博弈

Abstract: In order to quantitatively study mandatory lane-changing behavior of vehicles in a small section between mountainous expressway tunnel and interchange exit, a game model was proposed in conformity with characteristics of mandatory lane-changing behaviors. Firstly, lane-changing process of off-ramp vehicles and characteristics of such a decision were analyzed. Secondly, considering influences of driving style on such behaviors, a game model was put forward between these vehicles and following ones on target lanes by using dynamic game theories of incomplete information, and a game payoff matrix was established in consideration of the time and security benefits of game players. Then, refining Bayesian Nash equilibrium under forced lane-changing strategy was calculated. Finally, the validity of lane-changing game model was verified through Netlogo simulation platform. The results show that the optimal lane-changing strategy is that off-ramp vehicles, in spite of different driving styles, should choose forced lane change, while those following ones on target lanes should slow down to give way to them. Drivers with different styles vary significantly in terms of distance between lane-changing completion point and interchange exit, and that distance for aggressive drivers is generally greater than that for cautious ones.

Key words: tunnel to interchange, small spacing, driving behavior, mandatory lane-changing, signal game

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