Abstract:

Aiming at the problem of traffic offenders evading law enforcement by prejudging regulatory measures, this study explored the interference mechanism of compliance camouflage strategies on the reconnaissance behavior of traffic offenders, to improve the anti-reconnaissance efficiency of traffic management. Based on the dynamic game theory of incomplete information, a sequential decision-making model between managers (government/enterprise) and offenders during the reconnaissance stage was constructed. The signal distortion mechanism was used to quantify the interference effects of four camouflage strategies (honest performance, camouflage government style, camouflage enterprise style, random interference) on the Bayesian belief updating of offenders, and the optimal strategy combination was solved using the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An empirical study was conducted based on the road network of Xi'an High-tech Zone. The results show that differentiated equilibrium conditions exist in four typical scenarios. The government core area strategy increases the post-reconnaissance compliance probability by 82.3%. The enterprise park strategy induces a 40.3% rise in surface reconnaissance behavior. The suburban combination strategy reduces the violation rate by 41.7%. And the transportation hub area maintains a dynamic compliance index of 0.87±0.03. The spatio-temporal evolution demonstrats that the camouflage strategy delayed the convergence period of offenders' beliefs by 42%, drove an exponential decay of the violation rate by 73.7% within 30 days, and achieved an input-output ratio of 194%. This study indicates that, within legal frameworks such as warnings and indications, dynamic camouflage strategies can reverse information disadvantage by interfering with offenders' cognitive decision-making, thereby constructing a "cognitive-spatial-economic" collaborative governance paradigm and promoting the transformation of traffic supervision toward active intervention.

Key words: game, traffic supervision, camouflage strategy, nash equilibrium, traffic violation behaviors