Evolutionary game research on multi-body dynamic governance of intelligent coal mine safety risks

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2026.02.0247

Abstract

Abstract:

To improve the current situation of frequent disasters and accidents in coal mines, the game behaviors among various stakeholders in the dynamic governance of intelligent coal mine safety risks were investigated. A tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed involving the government, coal mine enterprises, and miners, to analyze the evolutionary stability among the three parties. Additionally, evolutionary game scenario simulations were employed to mimic the actual context of intelligent coal mine safety risk governance. Through this, the influence processes of factors such as governmental regulatory intensity and benefit-sharing ratio on the strategies of the gaming participants were revealed. The results indicate that governments should appropriately apply reward and punishment mechanisms during the regulation of enterprise safety governance. This approach can enhance corporate attention to safety risk management, reduce regulatory costs, and promote synergistic benefits between government and enterprises. High governance costs tend to reduce corporate enthusiasm for compliance and may encourage opportunistic behavior; therefore, incentive mechanisms and cost-sharing strategies are necessary to alleviate the burden on enterprises. Encouraging miner participation and reducing their involvement costs contribute to faster identification of potential safety risks and help prevent accidents.

Key words: intelligent coal mine, coal mine safety risk, dynamic governance, evolutionary game, scenario simulation

CLC Number:

X936

REN Lipeng, TONG Ruipeng. Evolutionary game research on multi-body dynamic governance of intelligent coal mine safety risks[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2026, 36(2): 253-261.

Figures/Tables 5

Fig.1

Table 1

Game payment matrix of government, coal mining enterprises and miners

矿工	煤矿企业	政府
矿工	煤矿企业	强监管	弱监管
积极参与	积极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 - a S$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 + (1 - b) C 2 + a S - E 1 - E 2 + e G 2$	$D 1 + D 2 - E 1 - E 2$
		$F 1 - h M 1$	$F 1 - (1 - h) M 1$
	消极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 + a P - G 1 - G 2 - G 3$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 - a P - E 1 - E 3$	$D 1 - E 1 - E 3$
		$- h M 1$	$- (1 - h) M 1$
消极参与	积极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 - a S$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 + (1 - b) C 2 + a S - E 1 - E 2 + e G 2$	$D 1 + D 2 - E 1 - E 2$
		$F 1 - M 2$	$F 1 - M 2$
	消极治理	$C 1 + b C 2 + a P - G 1 - G 2 - G 3$	$c C 1$
		$D 1 + D 2 - a P - E 1 - E 3$	$D 1 - E 1 - E 3$
		$- M 2$	$- M 2$

Table 1

Table 2

Stability analysis of system equilibrium points and eigenvalues

均衡点	雅可比矩阵特征值	正负	稳定条件	状态
$T 1 (0,0, 0)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c + P a$	$(±, +, +)$	—	鞍点
	$D 2 - E 2 + E 3$
	$M 2 - M 1 + M 1 h$
$T 2 (1,0, 0)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c - P a$	$(±, ±, +)$	—	鞍点
	$C 2 - E 2 + E 3 - C 2 b + G 2 e + P a + S a$
	$M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 3 (0,1, 0)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c - S a$	$(±, -, +)$	—	鞍点
	$E 2 - D 2 - E 3$
	$M 2 - M 1 + M 1 h$
$T 4 (0,0, 1)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c + P a$	$(±, +, -)$	—	鞍点
	$D 2 - E 2 + E 3$
	$M 1 - M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 5 (1,1, 0)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c + S a$	$(±, ±, +)$	—	鞍点
	$E 2 - C 2 - E 3 + C 2 b - G 2 e - P a - S a$
	$M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 6 (1,0, 1)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c - P a$	$(±, ±, -)$	$C 1 + C 2 b + P a > G 1 + G 2 + G 3 + C 1 c$ $E 2 - C 2 - E 3 > G 2 e + P a + S a - C 2 b$ $M 2 > M 1$	ESS
	$C 2 - E 2 + E 3 - C 2 b + G 2 e + P a + S a$
	$M 1 h - M 2$
$T 7 (0,1, 1)$	$C 1 - G 1 - G 2 - G 3 + C 2 b - C 1 c - S a$	$(±, -, -)$	$G 1 + G 2 + G 3 + C 1 c + S a > C 1 + C 2 b$ $D 2 > E 2 - E 3$ $M 2 > M 1$	ESS
	$E 2 - D 2 - E 3$
	$M 1 - M 2 - M 1 h$
$T 8 (1,1, 1)$	$G 1 - C 1 + G 2 + G 3 - C 2 b + C 1 c + S a$	$(±, ±, -)$	$C 1 + C 2 b > G 1 + G 2 + G 3 + C 1 c + S a$ $G 2 e + P a + S a - C 2 b > E 2 - C 2 - E 3$ $M 2 > M 1$	ESS
	$E 2 - C 2 - E 3 + C 2 b - G 2 e - P a - S a$
	$M 1 h - M 2$

Table 2

Fig.2

Fig.3

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