Research on safety supervision improvement of special equipment from a perspective of principal-agent theory

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.01.003

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to address the problem of increasing number and types of special equipment and lack of safety supervision, firstly, connotation of the special equipment's safety supervision was explained, and principal-agent relationship of it was analyzed. Then, a mathematical model was established based on principal-agent theory, and influence of factors such as supervision intensity, safety investment, public trust, on safety supervision effect and their internal mechanism were analyzed by using incentive compatibility constraint condition. Finally, an improvement strategy for safety supervision was proposed. The results show that intensifying punishment for accidents and increasing frequency for supervision can promote enterprises to work harder on ensuring safety of special equipment. Under the background that accident rate has been greatly reduced, the effect of promoting enterprises to further improve safety level by increasing supervision frequency will become less obvious. The higher safety investment is, the easier safety supervision tends to fail. However, it will help them to achieve safety goals if they can gain more additional income from high safety level of special equipment.

Key words: special equipment, principal-agent theory, safety supervision, safety economics, incentive compatibility principle

WANG Qing. Research on safety supervision improvement of special equipment from a perspective of principal-agent theory[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2022, 32(1): 20-26.

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