Evolutionary game of construction safety supervision involved by work safety service provider

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2023.12.2163

Abstract

Abstract:

This study aims to improve the current situation of high incidence of accidents in the process of construction work safety. The possible rent-seeking phenomenon of introducing the intermediary services for work safety was analyzed. By applying the method of game theory, a 3-party evolutionary game model was established among construction enterprises, work safety service providers and government regulators. The evolutionary characteristics of the 3-party behaviors were analyzed, and the stability of the equilibrium point in the game system was simulated. The results show that the high cost of implementing safety management makes the construction enterprises and work safety service providers choose behavior strategies that are not conducive to the safety management of construction projects. Reasonable control of the maintenance and rectification costs and the safety management inputs enables them to actively implement safety management strategies. In the process of supervision, the government should focus on work safety service providers, strengthening the regulation of the providers' behaviour, and guide the construction enterprises to act in accordance with the rules, which is conductive to achieving the goal of regulating the behaviour of both sides while saving costs and inputs. Simulating the public to actively participate in the supervision of construction safety and increasing the rent-seeking costs of enterprises and the speculative costs of providers can well guide the supervision of construction enterprises and work safety service providers to standardize their behaviour.

Key words: work safety service provider, construction safety supervision, construction enterprises, evolutionary game, rent-seeking costs

CHEN Shu, YIN Jia, SHAO Bo, CHEN Yun, WANG Yue. Evolutionary game of construction safety supervision involved by work safety service provider[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2023, 33(12): 8-15.

Figures/Tables 9

Fig.1

Tab.1

Strategy game matrix among construction enterprises, work safety service providers and government regulator

建筑企业	安全生产服务机构	政府监管部门
建筑企业	安全生产服务机构	严格监管z	不严格监管( $1 - z$ )
按章办事x	履职尽责y	$R j - C j, R a - C a, R z - C z - R a$	$R j - C j, R a - C a, R z - R a$
按章办事x	不履职尽责( $1 - y$ )	$R j - C j, R a - F a - C a t, R z - C z - R a + F a$	$R j - C j, R a - C a t, R z - R a$
不按章办事 ( $1 - x$ )	履职尽责y	$R j - F j - W j, R a - C a, R z - C z - R a + F j$	$R j - W j, R a - C a, R z - R a$
不按章办事 ( $1 - x$ )	不履职尽责 ( $1 - y$ )	$R j - B j - F j - W j, R a - F a - C a t + B j$ , $R z - C z - R a + F j + F a$	$R j - B j - α (S j + D j), R a - C a t - α (S a + D a) + B j, (1 - α) R z - R a - α D z$

Tab.1

Tab.2

Equilibrium point stability analysis

均衡点	雅克比矩阵特征值		稳定性结论	条件
均衡点	$λ 1, λ 2, λ 3$	实部符号	稳定性结论	条件
$E 1 (0,0, 0)$	$B j - C j + α (S j + D j), C a t - C a - B j + α (S a + D a), F a + F j - C z + α (D z + R z)$	$(×, ×, ×)$	ESS	①
$E 2 (1,0, 0)$	$C j - B j - α (S j + D j), C a t - C a, F a - C z$	$(×, ×, ×)$	ESS	②
$E 3 (0,1, 0)$	$W j - C j, C a - C a t + B j - α (S a + D a), F j - C z$	$(×, ×, ×)$	ESS	③
$E 4 (0,0, 1)$	$F j + B j + W j - C j, C a t - C a + F a - B j, C z - F a - F j - α (D z + R z)$	$(×, ×, ×)$	ESS	④
$E 5 (1,1, 0)$	$C j - W j, C a - C a t, - C z$	$(×, ×, -)$	ESS	⑤
$E 6 (1,0, 1)$	$C j - W j - F j - B j, C a t - C a + F a, C z - F a$	$(×, ×, ×)$	ESS	⑥
$E 7 (0,1, 1)$	$F j + W j - C j, C a - C a t - F a + B j, C z - F j$	$(×, ×, ×)$	ESS	⑦
$E 8 (1,1, 1)$	$C j - W j - F j, C a - C a t - F a, C z$	$(×, ×, +)$	不稳定点	—

Tab.2

Fig.2

Fig.3

Fig.4

Fig.5

Fig.6

Fig.7

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