Abstract:

To address the dilemma of hazardous materials transportation safety regulation, a three-party evolutionary game model involving transport enterprises, local governments, and the public was constructed to analyze the interaction mechanisms and strategy evolution paths among the stakeholders. First, by introducing public participation as a key variable, the objective of profit maximization for enterprises, social welfare maximization for the government, and safety utility maximization for the public were set as the decision-making goals, thereby establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, the replicator dynamic equations for the strategic choices of the three parties were formulated and solved. Through analyzing the strategic interactions in long-term repeated games and applying the Jacobian matrix and Lyapunov discriminant methods, the stability conditions for the eight potential convergence equilibrium points in the system's evolution were determined. Finally, numerical simulations were employed to reveal the impacts of key parameters, such as the cost of legal transportation for enterprises, public safety awareness, and regulatory fines, on the evolution of the system. The results indicate that reducing the cost of legal transportation for enterprises can guide them to proactively adopt compliant transportation behaviors; enhancing public safety awareness can drive the government to enforce stricter supervision, thereby encouraging enterprises to choose legal transportation; and reasonably setting regulatory fines can effectively adjust the strategic choices of all parties within specific parameter intervals, thereby optimizing the overall effectiveness of supervision.

Key words: public participation, hazardous materials transportation, safety regulation, evolutionary game, evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS)