中国安全科学学报 ›› 2018, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (7): 159-164.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2018.07.026

• 安全社会工程 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业提供与建筑工人参加安全培训的博弈研究

王新成1, 孙继德2 副教授, 张召普1, 王海峰3, 黄宇2   

  1. 1上海交通大学 安泰经济管理学院,上海 200030;
    2 同济大学 经济与管理学院,上海 200092;
    3 上海外国语大学 国际工商管理学院,上海 201620
  • 收稿日期:2018-04-09 修回日期:2018-06-18 出版日期:2018-07-28 发布日期:2020-11-25
  • 作者简介:王新成(1989—),男,山东德州人,博士研究生,研究方向为项目管理、战略管理。E-mail:wxc2040@163.com。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助(71472139)。

A model for game between safety training provision of firm and worker' attendance to it in construction industry

WANG Xincheng1, SUN Jide2, ZHANG Zhaopu1, WANG Haifeng3, HUANG Yu2   

  1. 1 Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China;
    2 School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China;
    3 School of Business and Management,Shanghai International Studies University,Shanghai 201620,China
  • Received:2018-04-09 Revised:2018-06-18 Online:2018-07-28 Published:2020-11-25

摘要: 为提高建筑工人的安全技能,采用演化博弈的理论方法,研究影响施工企业提供安全技能培训和建筑工人参加安全技能培训项目意愿的因素。通过识别企业和工人博弈的利益焦点,构建政府参与下的施工企业是否提供安全技能培训和建筑工人是否参与培训的博弈支付矩阵,分析九种情境下,企业和工人动态演化系统的演化稳定策略(ESS)。研究表明:没有政府对施工企业的奖惩措施,企业不会提供安全技能培训;在政府参与下,只要不提供安全技能培训可以获得收益,施工企业不会提供安全技能培训;只有培训后提高收益,建筑工人才会参加安全技能培训。

关键词: 建筑工人, 安全技能培训, 政府, 演化博弈论, 演化稳定策略(ESS)

Abstract: In the construction industry,there is a consensus among researchers and practitioners that construction workers have a little safety skillset.Aspects influencing firm' decision to provide safety skills training and construction worker's willingness to engage in this training program were explored through the lens of evolutionary game theory.What firm and worker focuse on were identified,and then a model was built for evolutionary game under the condition of government intervention,in which a dynamic relationship between firm's intent to offer a safety skill training program and worker's intent to attend that training program,was framed.Three ESSs were demonstrated for 9 game cases,as well as the requirements of every ESS.The results show that in the absence of government intervention,firm can not be expected to offer safety skills training to workers.In the case of government intervention,firm offers willfully a training program only when it benefits from that training,and as for workers,they are found to proactively engage in such a training program on the condition that they gain much more,not just a little,benefits.

Key words: construction worker, safety skill training, government, evolutionary game theory, evolutionary steady strategy (ESS)

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